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Since 2012, official government policy documents 
have increasingly focused on police leadership in 
South Africa. The National Development Plan (NDP)2 
speaks of a ‘serial crisis of top management’ and 
includes recommendations aimed at improving the 
quality and competencies of senior police managers.3 
It identifies good leadership as being at the heart of 
what is required to address the numerous challenges 
facing the South African Police Service (SAPS). 
The draft White Paper on Police states that South 
Africa is entitled to a police service ‘that exhibits 
exemplary leadership and management’.4 It further 
refers to the importance of ethical leadership and 
how ‘police leadership and management must ensure 
a clear normative standard of the highest quality’.5
Neither the NDP nor the White Paper, however, 
explains the reasons for their focus on police 
leadership. No diagnosis of the failings of past 
and current SAPS leadership is presented. No 
explanations are provided as to how these failings 
may be the cause of key organisational challenges 
facing the SAPS, or what the consequences are for 
public safety.  
The Marikana Commission of Inquiry into the killings 
that took place in the run-up to and on 16 August 
2012,  provides useful insights into the workings of 
SAPS senior leadership.6 Based on the findings of 
the commission, there is now objective information 
on the nature of senior police leadership decision-
making in the lead-up to the massacre. Moreover, 
there are findings relating to the integrity of senior 
police leadership, based on their engagement with 
the commission, which was established to unearth 
the facts of what happened on that day.  
This article outlines the key characteristics of good 
police leaders and the principles that should guide 
their actions. It then discusses relevant findings of the 
commission pertaining to senior SAPS commanders. 
The article argues that the crisis of police leadership 
The Marikana Commission of Inquiry report presented damning findings against the South African Police 
Service (SAPS) National Commissioner, Riah Phiyega, and the senior commanders involved in the Marikana 
massacre. Their decision to disarm and disperse striking miners was found to be flawed and to have resulted 
in police officers unjustifiably shooting 112 striking mineworkers, killing 34 of them. Moreover, their integrity was 
found wanting on the basis that Phiyega and her senior commanders withheld crucial evidence, constructed 
misleading evidence, and provided untruthful testimony before the commission. This article argues that a 
necessary condition for improvements to take place in the SAPS relates to improving the top leadership of 
the organisation. Fortunately, the National Development Plan provides a starting point as to how this can be 
achieved.‘Police supervisors at any level need to be aware that their behaviour has a strong impact on the 
organisational culture, which in turn contributes to police behaviour.’1
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may be used to explain certain worrying indicators, 
reflecting the deterioration of police effectiveness and 
public credibility in recent years. It reflects on what 
can be done to improve the senior leadership of the 
SAPS – this being a precondition for the improvement 
of policing in South Africa. 
Police leadership in a democracy
Policing ‘refers to the work of the public, civilian (non-
military) institution that is empowered by government 
to enforce the law and ensure public order through 
the legitimised use of force’.7 It has been argued by 
international policing experts such as Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology Professor Gary T Marx that 
one element that defines a democracy is a police 
force that:
•	 Is	subject	to	the	rule	of	law,	embodying	values	
respectful of human dignity, rather than the wishes 
of a powerful leader or party
•	 Can	intervene	in	the	life	of	citizens	only	under	
limited and carefully controlled circumstances 
•	 Is	publicly	accountable8
Indeed, international research on the democratic 
objectives of police agencies holds that police 
should, inter alia, strive to: 
•	 Promote	public	trust	and	confidence	(necessary	
prerequisites for effective policing)
•	 Stand	outside	of	politics	while	protecting	the	
democratic rights of the public (for example to 
exercise free speech, freedom of association and 
other democratic rights)
•	 Be	guided	by	the	principle	that	everyone	shall	
be subject to limitations determined by law 
when intervening in conflicts between groups or 
individuals9
In crafting a new vision and orientation for the police 
in South Africa, the drafters of the South African 
Constitution accepted and included references 
to these principles. For example, the Constitution 
emphasises that none of the country’s security 
services, nor any of their members, ‘may in the 
performance of their functions 
(a) prejudice a political party interest that is legitimate 
in terms of the Constitution; or
(b) further in a partisan manner any interest of a 
political party.’10  
Moreover, the legislation giving effect to the 
establishment of the SAPS specifically intends to 
ensure that the police do not act, and are not seen to 
act, in a politically partisan manner, by stating that no 
police member shall in anyway associate themselves 
with a political party, hold any office in a political party, 
or ‘… in any manner further or prejudice party political 
interests’.11 The principle of non-political partisanship 
is crucial for a police service if it is to secure public 
trust and legitimacy. 
If leaders of a police service in a democracy are to 
‘secure public trust and legitimacy’, it is important 
that they display a high level of integrity. For the 
purposes of this article, the definition of police 
leadership integrity refers to the extent to which 
police commanders act and speak in accordance 
with a core set of formal organisational values.12 For 
a South African police leader to be seen as having 
integrity, he or she should behave in accordance with 
the SAPS Code of Conduct, which inter alia states 
that SAPS officers will ‘act impartially, courteously, 
honestly, respectfully, transparently and in an 
accountable manner’.13 
Various studies have identified characteristics 
synonymous with integrity as particularly important 
for effective police leadership. For example, the 
Australian Institute of Police Management undertook 
a meta-analysis of 57 empirically based articles into 
the requirements for effective police leadership from 
Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand 
and the United States.14 This study identified seven 
key characteristics that were considered necessary 
for a police commander to be effective. Three of 
these characteristics are commonly associated 
with integrity, namely that a police leader must be 
ethical, trustworthy and legitimate. The remaining 
four characteristics are that police leaders should 
recognise the need to ‘act as a role model; be good 
communicators; be critical and creative thinkers; and 
be able to make good decisions’.15  
The findings of the commission as they relate to 
senior police leadership in the SAPS can now 
be assessed against the key principles and 
characteristics highlighted above. This exercise will 
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provide some insight into the nature of the challenges 
implicitly referred to by the NDP and the White Paper 
as they pertain to the senior police leadership at the 
time of writing. 
The serial crisis and politicisation 
of top police management
The SA Constitution mandates the president to 
appoint the SAPS national commissioner.16 However, 
it has been argued that, unlike many other senior 
appointments, there are inadequate minimum 
objective criteria to guide the president when 
making this appointment.17 The consequence has 
been that appointments to the post of SAPS 
national commissioner during the post-apartheid 
era have predominantly been compromised 
individuals who have not had relevant policing 
qualifications or experience.  
In 2000, then-president Thabo Mbeki appointed 
Jackie Selebi to the post of SAPS national 
commissioner. Selebi had a long history in the 
African National Congress (ANC). He was elected as 
president of its Youth League and appointed to its 
most senior decision-making structure, the National 
Executive Committee (NEC), while in exile in Zambia 
in 1987.18 He was also appointed a member of 
Parliament in 1994, and before being appointed to 
the post of SAPS commissioner, Selebi had served 
as the South African ambassador and permanent 
representative to the United Nations and Director-
General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a post he 
held until 1999. 
He was perceived to be personally loyal to Mbeki, 
who reportedly went to extraordinary lengths to 
prevent him from being arrested and prosecuted 
on corruption charges, for which he was ultimately 
convicted and sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment 
in 2010.19 Arguably, this dealt a significant blow to the 
morale of senior police commanders and the public 
credibility of the SAPS, given the substantial publicity 
that the investigation and prosecution of Selebi 
garnered in the local and international media. 
When Jacob Zuma became president, he appointed 
a powerful provincial ANC politician who was then 
the KwaZulu-Natal member of the Executive Council 
(MEC) for Community Safety, Bheki Cele, to the post 
of SAPS national commissioner. Cele was seen to 
be close to Zuma and although he had no formal 
policing experience, had at least held a post that 
required him to exercise oversight of the SAPS 
on behalf of the KwaZulu-Natal Provincial 
Executive Committee. 
During his relatively short term in office, Cele became 
closely associated with ongoing attempts to militarise 
the SAPS when he established the controversial and 
paramilitarised tactical response teams in 2009,20 
and reintroduced military ranks to the SAPS in 
2011.21 Cele was eventually fired by the president 
on the recommendation of a board of inquiry into 
his fitness to hold office, following a public outcry 
over his involvement in tender irregularities involving 
R1.7 billion.22 As with Selebi before him, the removal 
of the most senior SAPS commander, following 
a highly publicised scandal, could not have been 
positive for police morale or public credibility. 
Zuma then appointed Riah Phiyega to the post of 
SAPS national commissioner on 13 June 2012. At 
the time of her appointment, much was made of her 
prior management experience.23 However, her lack of 
police experience and any proven ability to address 
the types of organisational challenges facing the 
SAPS was publicly raised as a concern at the time.24 
A little more than a year after her appointment, the 
ongoing negative publicity surrounding Phiyega once 
again raised questions about her suitability for the 
post of national commissioner.25 
It was the findings of the Marikana Commission of 
Inquiry, headed by retired Judge Ian Farlam and two 
senior advocates, that first raised official concerns 
about Phiyega’s fitness to hold office. Despite the 
constitutional and legal imperative that requires 
Phiyega and her senior officers to act impartially, 
the commission found that in the days running up 
to the massacre, ‘Gen. Phiyega was complicit in 
engaging in discussions where political factors were 
inappropriately considered and discussed in relation 
to policing the situation at Marikana’.26 Specifically, 
Phiyega and Lt.-Gen. Zukiswa Mbombo discussed 
the possibility that Julius Malema, the leader of the 
then newly launched Economic Freedom Fighters 
(EFF), might arrive at Marikana during the strike and 
take credit for diffusing the situation.27
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Moreover, transcript evidence before the commission 
revealed that Mbombo discussed Phiyega’s concerns 
with Lonmin mine management, saying that, 
•	 ‘She	did	not	want	mining	companies	to	be	seen	to	
be supporting AMCU [The Association of Mining 
and Construction Workers]
•	 She	did	not	want	mining	companies	to	undermine	
NUM [National Union of Mineworkers]
•	 She	was	responding	to	what	she	perceived	as	
pressure from Mr Cyril Ramaphosa, whom she 
considered to be politically influential
•	 She	wanted	to	end	the	violence	before	Mr	Julius	
Malema arrived in Marikana and was given credit 
for defusing the situation
•	 She	was	concerned	that	Mr	Malema	supported	
nationalisation of the mines.’28
The commission found such conduct ‘inconsistent 
with our constitutional and statutory regime which 
requires that policing be conducted in an impartial 
and unbiased manner’.29  
Decision-making and 
avoiding bloodshed
If police commanders rely primarily on their legal and 
policy obligations, they may be less likely to make 
decisions that would result in the unnecessary loss 
of life or injury to people. Indeed, Section 12(1)(c) of 
the Constitution states specifically that, ‘[e]veryone 
has the right to freedom and security of the person, 
which includes the right … to be free from all forms of 
violence from either public or private sources’.30
The South African Police Service Act, which governs 
police conduct, is explicit in stating that where police 
officers have to use force, it must be ‘the minimum 
force which is reasonable in the circumstances’.31 
This principle is also presented in the SAPS Code 
of Conduct, which states that all police officers are 
expected to exercise their powers in a ‘responsible 
and controlled manner’.32 
The SAPS legal team argued that the decision 
to remove the striking mineworkers from the hill 
(referred to as a ‘koppie’ in South Africa) where 
they had been gathering each day, was taken by 
police commanders on the scene at around 13h00 
on 16 August, and in response to circumstances 
that required action from the police. However, the 
commission found this version of events to be 
false. Rather, the commission found, the decision 
to disarm and disperse the striking mineworkers 
was taken by senior SAPS leaders, who had 
attended an ‘extraordinary session’ of the SAPS 
National Management Forum the evening before 
(15 August).33 
This finding is significant because the evidence 
before the commission showed that senior 
operational commanders ‘warned the Provincial 
Commissioner that proceeding to the tactical option 
that day would involve bloodshed’.34 Rather than 
revisit the decision to disperse, disarm and arrest 
the striking mineworkers, top SAPS commanders, 
including the SAPS commissioner, accepted that 
bloodshed might follow.35  
The six experienced lawyers who were hired by the 
commission to act as impartial evidence leaders 
concluded in their final argument, ‘That a bloody 
confrontation was anticipated by at least some 
senior members of the SAPS is evidenced by the 
fact that 4 000 additional rounds of R5 ammunition 
were ordered for delivery and that attempts were 
made to procure the attendance of four mortuary 
vehicles (which would have provided for the 
removal of sixteen corpses).’ The commission 
accepted this argument by the evidence leaders 
as an accurate assessment.36 The commission 
found that any decision by police commanders to 
use force, when in all probability such force would 
be unnecessary, could be considered to be an 
illegal decision.37 Moreover, they had breached the 
McCann Principle, accepted in South African law, 
‘which requires the planners of policing operations 
where force may possibly be used to plan and 
command the operations in such a way as to 
minimise the risk that lethal force will be used’.38 
Concerns about a lack of integrity 
and accountability
One of the more damning findings of the 
commission regarding the SAPS national 
commissioner and her senior managers was that 
they had sought to mislead the commission. The 
commission found that, in an effort to distract from 
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police failings at Marikana, the scene was set for 
a ‘cover-up’ very early on. The day after the police 
shootings, Phiyega addressed a police parade, 
stating that, ‘what happened represents the best of 
responsible policing. You did what you did because 
you were being responsible.’39  
The commission found that this statement was
 … singularly inappropriate because it set out 
what was from then on to be the official police 
line: that no blame at all attach to the police for 
what happened as they were being responsible 
in what they did. This was calculated to effect 
the closing of the ranks encouraging those who 
had participated in the operation to withhold 
information from the commission and indeed to 
deny that mistakes had been made and things 
had been done that could not be described as 
‘the best of responsible policing’40 
Indeed, the commission found that efforts to 
construct a police version of events took place at a 
police meeting held from 27 August to 8 September 
2012 in Potchefstroom, referred to at the commission 
as the ‘Roots Conference’.41 The commission agreed 
with arguments that this conference was used by 
the SAPS leadership as an ‘opportunity to collude’ 
in order to construct ‘tailored’ evidence, withhold 
certain damning evidence and provide other evidence 
that was ‘materially false’ before the commission so 
as to support the SAPS’s manufactured version of 
events at Marikana both in the run-up to and during 
the massacre.42 
The commission agreed that both the national and 
provincial commissioners had seen the (SAPS) 
presentation prior to being submitted to the 
Commission and they would have been well aware 
of some of the omissions and misleading information 
contained therein.43
The evidence leaders’ closing submission in this 
regard was that Phiyega ‘gave false evidence 
to the commission and her evidence before the 
commission was generally characterised by a lack 
of candor’.44 The evidence leaders also argued that 
Phiyega’s ‘immediate response to the shootings was 
incompatible with the office of the head of a police 
service in a constitutional state’.45 
The commission accepted that the most senior 
police leaders had been dishonest and therefore 
recommended that the president establish a board 
of inquiry under section 8 (1) of the SAPS Act to 
consider the fitness of Phiyega and Mbombo to hold 
office in the SAPS. This was due to the finding that 
senior SAPS leadership at the ‘highest level’ gave 
false or misleading evidence before the commission 
and should therefore be the subject of an inquiry to 
establish whether they were guilty of misconduct in 
attempting to mislead the commission.46
The impact of compromised 
police leadership
Arguably, the ‘serial crisis of top management’ as 
stated by the NDP and briefly discussed above has 
started to take its toll on the effectiveness and public 
credibility of the SAPS.  While it is beyond the scope 
of this article to provide a full assessment of the 
evidence available, there are indicators that are 
worth considering.  
At the time of writing, the SAPS national 
spokesperson argued that most of the negative 
public attitude about the police was a result of poor 
or unbalanced journalism.47 There are certainly many 
examples of good police work and many dedicated 
and professional officers in the SAPS at all levels, but 
while the media does tend to focus on sensational 
stories that may be considered ‘bad news’, there are 
many well-documented police shortcomings that are 
directly related to SAPS leadership. 
A good example of this is the deterioration in the 
productivity of the SAPS Crime Intelligence Division 
since 2011/12. The ability to produce reliable crime 
intelligence would be one of the most important police 
functions if the police were then able to mobilise their 
considerable resources towards identifying those 
involved in repeat violent offending. Policing experts 
have asserted that crime intelligence ‘should underlie 
all crime combating activities of the police’.48
SAPS Crime Intelligence found itself severely 
destabilised during 2011, following the various 
criminal charges that were laid against its national 
commander, Lt.-Gen. Richard Mdluli.49 Mdluli was 
initially appointed in July 2009, following a meeting 
with four of Zuma’s cabinet ministers, without proper 
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procedures being followed.50 Various investigations 
against him were undertaken, resulting in murder 
charges being laid against him on 31 March 2011 and 
his suspension a little over a week later.51 Later that 
year, on 21 September, he was charged on separate 
cases of fraud and corruption.52 
Mdluli then wrote a letter to Zuma stating that ‘in the 
event I come back to work I will assist the President 
to succeed next year’ –  in reference to the ANC’s 
national elective conference that was to be held in 
December 2012.53 The fraud and corruption charges 
were then irregularly withdrawn on 14 December 
2011 and the murder charges similarly withdrawn on 
2 February.54 The following month Mdluli’s suspension 
was lifted and he returned to head the national SAPS 
Crime Intelligence Division. 
The civil society organisation Freedom Under Law 
(FUL) subsequently launched a successful application 
to the North Gauteng High Court, resulting in Mdluli’s 
being interdicted from executing his duties as a police 
officer, given the substantial evidence of criminality 
against him.55 The various criminal charges were 
re-instated, following a Supreme Court of Appeal on 
the matter, which also ‘directed the Commissioner of 
Police to reinstate the disciplinary proceedings and 
to take all steps necessary for the prosecution and 
finalisation of these proceedings’.56 
At the time of writing, 15 months after this judgement, 
the SAPS national commissioner had yet to take 
disciplinary action against Mdluli, and reportedly 
allowed his perks and privileges to continue, at 
great cost to the state.57 The Crime Intelligence 
Division has been managed by different officers 
in an acting capacity, which has arguably caused 
uncertainty among its personnel, thereby undermining 
the ability of crime intelligence to operate at its full 
capacity. Evidence of this situation can be found 
in an assessment of the SAPS annual reports that 
demonstrates overall productivity of this division 
declining by 19% between 2009/10 and 2011/12.58
An additional indicator that all is not well within the 
SAPS is the substantial increase in the number of 
people leaving the organisation.  In the four years 
ending in 2012/13, the average number of people 
leaving the SAPS stood at 2 743.59 However, this 
has risen dramatically since then, so that in the 
2014/15 financial year, over 7 000 people left the 
SAPS.60 It was also revealed that of this number 
1 200 were detectives, a division already experiencing 
severe shortages.61
The consequence of the deterioration of intelligence 
and the loss of experienced detectives can be seen 
in the substantial growth of violent acquisitive crime 
in South Africa. In 2013/14, a total of 119 351 
aggravated robberies were reported to the police.62 
This is over 18 000 more armed robberies than were 
reported to the police two years ago, in 2011/12.63 
Consequently, there are on average 50 more robberies 
taking place every single day across South Africa 
than was the situation two years ago. More and 
more people are being attacked by armed criminals 
while walking the streets, with those who use public 
transport most at risk. However, armed gangs are 
also increasingly attacking people in their homes and 
workplaces, or hijacking them while driving.  
Aggravated robbery is a type of crime that the SAPS 
has the resources and operational know-how to 
reduce. This was evidenced with the success of the 
implementation of the Gauteng Aggravated Robbery 
Strategy in 2009.64 This police intelligence-led strategy 
with dedicated detective support contributed to 
a 21.3% reduction in house robberies, a 19.8% 
reduction in non-residential (primarily business) 
robberies and a 32.8% reduction in vehicle hijacking 
between 2011/12 and 2012/13.65 But with no 
dedicated strategy to address these categories of 
robbery since 2012/13, incidents of robbery have 
subsequently increased. Ensuring the development 
and implementation of effective crime strategies is 
arguably a core function of police leadership. 
Increasing crime rates, along with high levels of police 
misconduct, appear to be contributing to low levels of 
public trust in the police. For example, a 2014 survey 
found that ‘three quarters of South Africans believe 
that a lot of police are criminals themselves’ and 
33% said that they were ‘scared of the police’.66 
Moreover, the proportion of victims of crime who 
report their incident to the police had declined 
substantially across various crime categories. The 
National Victims of Crime Survey revealed that, 
between 2011 and 2014, the proportion of victims 
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of robbery who reported their attack to the police 
dropped by 8% while that for sexual assault dropped 
by 19.9%.67
Improving SAPS leadership
On 21 August 2015, Zuma stated that he had 
written to Phiyega to inform her that he would be 
establishing a board of inquiry into her fitness to hold 
office, as per the recommendations of the Marikana 
Commission.68 However, even if this board of inquiry 
were to recommend the dismissal of the SAPS 
national commissioner, simply replacing her will not 
enhance overall senior leadership in the SAPS, 
given the substantial challenges facing 
the organisation.  
The Marikana Commission report refers extensively 
to the NDP, which described the SAPS as having 
become increasingly militarised and re-politicised 
since 2000.69 Arguably, these dynamics have served 
to influence the organisational culture of the SAPS, 
a concern recognised by the NDP. It therefore 
recommends that ‘the organisational culture and 
subcultures of the police should be reviewed to 
assess the effects of militarisation, demilitarisation 
and the serial crises of top management’.70
Part of the problem has been the ongoing challenge, 
over the years, of senior appointments that have 
been made irregularly and for reasons other than 
the skills and abilities of the appointees. Although 
there are clear criteria and procedures in the SAPS 
for making senior appointments, the national 
commissioner is legally able to override these 
procedures. Ostensibly, this is to enable the national 
commissioner to bring new and scarce skills into 
the organisation. This makes sense, given that new 
policing challenges for which the SAPS might not be 
prepared, may emerge over time. For example, with 
the rise in cyber crime, new and complex skill sets 
and expertise that are not immediately available within 
the organisation may become necessary. 
Far too often, however, this authority has been 
misused by SAPS national commissioners to appoint 
people into senior positions without their having the 
necessary skills, experience or integrity. This is a 
problem that has been raised by the Parliamentary 
Police Portfolio for years, with a former chairperson 
stating that such practices in her opinion were, 
‘wrong, unjust and should not be allowed’.71
According to the Marikana Commission, finding a 
solution to changing the culture of the SAPS is ‘an 
urgent priority and has to start at the very top. Other 
senior officers and rank and file members of the 
SAPS can hardly be expected to see the need for 
the SAPS to act in a non-political manner, and to act 
accordingly, if the example set by their most senior 
leaders is exactly the opposite’.72
Fortunately for the president and his cabinet, 
the NDP formally adopted in 2012 provides a 
number of specific recommendations on how to 
go about improving the leadership of the SAPS 
so as to professionalise the organisation.73 These 
recommendations are summarised and briefly 
discussed below.
•	 A	National	Policing	Board	(NPB)	should	be	
established with multi-sectoral and multi-
disciplinary expertise to set objective standards 
 for recruitment, selection, appointment and 
promotion. The NDP is silent on the composition 
 of this body, but given its purpose it should 
 include recognised professionals who understand 
the demands of executive management in large 
public sector organisations generally, and in the 
SAPS in particular. 
•	 The	national	commissioner	and	deputies	should	be	
appointed by the president after recommendations 
by a selection panel that would select and interview 
candidates against objective criteria, following a 
transparent and competitive recruitment process. 
The NDP does not state how the panel should be 
constituted but the above policing board could play 
this role so as to ensure that only the best possible 
men or women are appointed to the top leadership 
positions of the SAPS.
•	 The	NDP	recommends	that	a	competency	
assessment of all officers is undertaken. It is silent 
on who should undertake this assessment, but 
arguably it could also be undertaken or overseen 
by the NPB, and should start by assessing the 
competency and integrity of those holding the rank 
of Lieutenant-General, followed by those holding 
the rank of Major General. Once these two rank 
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levels consist only of experienced men and women 
whose integrity is beyond reproach, the SAPS will 
have a top management team of approximately 
 70 people who could then undertake the remaining 
recommendations to professionalise the SAPS. 
•	 In	the	next	five	years	a	two-stream	system	should	
be developed to create high-calibre officers and 
recruits (non-commissioned officer and officer 
streams) who will be trained as professionals. This 
should ensure that there is an ongoing corps of 
trained police managers who could take up top 
positions as they become available and remove 
 the long-standing problem of inappropriate lateral 
level appointments. 
The commission appears concerned that no concrete 
action has been taken to implement the various 
recommendations: ‘It is now three years since the 
National Planning Commission published the National 
Development Plan, and more than two years since 
the report was handed to the President.’74 
The SAPS is a very large and complex organisation, 
with almost 200 000 personnel facing a range 
of difficult challenges. However, had these 
recommendations been implemented once the 
NDP was adopted by cabinet in September 2012, 
headway might have been made to improve the 
SAPS leadership. 
Honest and skilled senior leadership will not 
necessarily guarantee the reduction of crime and 
the eradication of police misconduct – but such 
leadership is a prerequisite for the improvement of 
the organisation. Fortunately the SAPS has highly 
experienced and honest police managers at all 
levels. These men and women could provide a solid 
foundation for professionalising the SAPS, in line 
with the vision of the NDP. Police appointments 
need to be depoliticised so that only the best and 
most honest are able to make it to the top of the 
organisation.
To comment on this article visit 
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